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ABSTRACT To identify the key factors and create the landscape of cybersecurity for embedded systems
(CSES), an analytical review of the existing research on CSES has been conducted. The common properties
of embedded systems, such as mobility, small size, low cost, independence, and limited power consumption
when compared to traditional computer systems, have caused many challenges in CSES. The conflict
between cybersecurity requirements and the computing capabilities of embedded systems makes it critical
to implement sophisticated security countermeasures against cyber-attacks in an embedded system with
limited resources, without draining those resources. In this study, twelve factors influencing CSES have
been identified: (1) the components; (2) the characteristics; (3) the implementation; (4) the technical domain;
(5) the security requirements; (6) the security problems; (7) the connectivity protocols; (8) the attack surfaces;
(9) the impact of the cyber-attacks; (10) the security challenges of the ESs; (11) the security solutions; and
(12) the players (manufacturers, legislators, operators, and users). AMultiple Layers Feedback Framework of
Embedded SystemCybersecurity (MuLFESC)with nine layers of protection is proposed, with newmetrics of
risk assessment. This will enable cybersecurity practitioners to conduct an assessment of their systems with
regard to twelve identified cybersecurity aspects. In MuLFESC, the feedback from the system-components
layer to the system-operations layer could help implement ‘‘Security by Design’’ in the design stage at
the bottom layer. The study provides a clear landscape of CSES and, therefore, could help to find better
comprehensive solutions for CSES.
INDEX TERMS Characteristics of embedded system, countermeasures, embedded system, cybersecurity of
embedded system, MuLFESC, risk assessment.
I. INTRODUCTION
The embedded system (ES) concept, in its simplest form,
is manifested when a processing unit is integrated into a
larger physical system to steer its functions. For decades, ESs
have gone through different stages of development until they
have reached what they are today. The capabilities of ESs
evolved in conjunction with several key technologies. The
most common technologies are integrated circuits (ICs), such
as Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) and Appli-
cation Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs). The difference
between FPGAs and ASICs lies in the fact that FPGAs are
reconfigurable, whereas ASICs must be pre-configured for
the purpose for which they are manufactured. During the
course of embedded system development, the inclusion of
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Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), microcontrollers,
and microprocessors played a vital role in the advancing of
the capabilities of ESs, allowing them to be employed in a
wide variety of applications. With the development of the
Internet of Things (IoT), ESs have shown great potential
in IoT network connected systems, and their capabilities
have been increasingly improved, moving closer to those of
traditional IT systems.
Technology is experiencing significant development
because of the expansion of Cyber-Physical Systems
(CPS), or IoT-enabled CPS. In all application domains of
IoT-enabled CPS, such as Smart Cities, Supervisory Con-
trol, and Data Acquisition systems (SCADA), healthcare,
transportation, communication, military, unmanned vehicles,
smartphone, smart grids, gas distribution systems, avionics,
and wearable devices, ESs have played significant roles in
sensing, computing, and controlling.
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The IoT and its cyber-physical environment bring great
benefits by connecting people, processes, and data. However,
IoT-enabled systems can be threatened by a wide variety of
cyber-attacks from criminals, terrorists, and hacktivists [1].
Connecting all devices to the Internet and using off-the-shelf
solutions is causing the vulnerabilities of CPS to grow [2].
If we look at what damage cyber-attacks can cause to tradi-
tional computer systems despite their computing capabilities,
we will recognize the scale of the challenge that faces ESs,
with their limited capabilities, when dealing with these cyber-
attacks. The high profile WannaCry ransomware attacks in
May 2017 showed how victims could be prevented from using
their computers or accessing their data. The UK, Spain, Rus-
sia, Ukraine, and Taiwan were among the affected countries,
with vital data, including confidential medical records, being
held to ransom [3]. In another example, a malicious actor
infiltrated a German steel facility in 2014. The adversary
used a spear-phishing email to gain access to the corporate
network and then moved into the plant network, resulting in
massive physical damage [1], [4], [5]. Cyberattacks clearly
have the potential to disrupt or damage physical systems
in various application domains mentioned above [1], as the
previous developers did not take cybersecurity into account
in the design of ESs.
With connectivity to the Internet, ESs are more vulnera-
ble to cyberattacks than ever before and with their limited
resources, the problem is exacerbated. In addition, the many
influencing factors and involved parties that should be taken
into account makes it difficult to determine where deficien-
cies lie in security measures. Therefore, the study of CSES
needs to consider the application context, and advanced and
comprehensive ESs security solutions are necessary because
of their crucial roles in a diversity of domains.
This survey aims to identify the security challenges and
gaps in CSES by determining the influencing factors and
related parties, thereby assessing the current status of coun-
termeasures and security solutions against cyber-attacks.
To appraise the factors that could affect cybersecurity,
we need to understand the structure of the embedded sys-
tem, its hardware and software components, security objec-
tives, and the vulnerabilities that an attacker can exploit,
as well the role of the related parties, including manufac-
turers, operators, users, and legislators. In this way we can
draw the overall landscape of the CSES to help find better
solutions.
The remaining part of this paper is divided into five main
sections. Section II addresses the concept of ESs, their char-
acteristics, and related terminologies, as well as the prob-
lems that are a result of the limitations imposed by those
characteristics. In Section III, the security challenges facing
ESs as a result of security requirements and, in contrast,
their capabilities are discussed. In Section IV, cybersecurity is
addressed in relation to security objectives, countermeasures,
and risk management. In Section V, security risk metrics,
involved parties in CSES and the factors in the cybersecurity
industry and the Multiple Layers Feedback Framework of
Embedded System Cybersecurity (MuLFESC) are presented.
Finally, Section VI concludes the findings of the review.
II. EMBEDDED SYSTEMS
In the continuous pursuit of humankind to improve quality
of life, techniques, and knowledge to meet the aspirations
and needs of people, one of the most revolutionary aspects
appeared in the field of technology when inventors tried
to integrate computing operations into physical systems to
enable predefined functionality—so-called ‘‘Embedded Sys-
tems.’’ During this evolutionary period, significant advances
were made in various fields such as industry, health, aviation
and communications. The difference between these systems
and traditional computers and servers is that they are, as a
subsystem, integrated into a larger physical system to per-
form a specific, essential function. In contrast, computers
and servers are designed for multiple purposes, of which
computational operations for data processing are the main
purpose.
There are many definitions of ESs based on different
perspectives. As Vahid and Givargis [6] stated, it is not easy
to provide a precise definition of embedded computing sys-
tems, or simply embedded systems, and they stated that ‘‘an
embedded system is a computing system built into a larger
system, designed for dedicated functions. It consists of a
combination of hardware, software, and optionally mechan-
ical parts. Thus, the term refers to any computing systems
other than general-purpose PC ormainframe computers.’’ [7].
It is noticeable that the main criterion in calling a system an
embedded system is the embedding of a processing unit or
the integration of computational functionality within a larger
physical system to steer the functions of that CPS. Thus,
naming an embedded system does not depend on a specific
type of logic circuit, CPU, or architecture.
A. ARCHITECTURE OF AN EMBEDDED SYSTEM
Understanding the construction of the embedded system in
terms of entry points and the attack surface leads us to
predict which aspects should be protected from the risks of
cyberattacks. The field of ESs is vast. Due to the widespread
application of ESs in different technical domains, the design
of the architecture of ESs in different applications is not lim-
ited to a particular form. Manufacturers seek to configure the
design to fit the purpose it was designed for. An embedded
system is typically comprised of CPU, RAM, ROM, and
input/output ports [8]. Also, the embedded system CPU can
be constructed with instruction cache and data cache or with-
out the I/D caches to keep the CPU architecture simpler and
less expensive. To support information exchange or commu-
nication, the bus system of an embedded system includes the
system bus and the local bus. Figure 1 depicts the typical
architecture of ESs. The CPU is the heart of an embedded
system, but other componentsmust be added, such asmemory
and peripheral interfaces, in order to construct the embedded
system.
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FIGURE 1. Typical architecture of embedded system.
Designs range from small electronic circuits, through
microcontrollers with a small number of transistors and the
capacity of 8 bits, to multiple core 64-bit microprocessors
with speeds over 1 GHz. Various application-specific CPU
implementations and architectures are also used, such as
FPGA soft or hard cores, digital signal processors (DSPs),
or even recent cores optimized for machine learning. This
leads us to an important term, System on Chip (SoC): an
integrated circuit (IC, also known as a ‘‘chip’’) that integrates
all components of a computer, in addition to the digital and
analogue interfaces. A SoC can be built based on a micro-
controller or microprocessor, depending on the purpose of the
application. An embedded system can exchange information
with external devices through I/O ports. To exchange infor-
mation remotely, an ES usually is connected to a communica-
tion subsystem. The power subsystem provides the power to
the components of the ES, with many being battery-powered.
There are various types of embedded systems currently on
the market. For example, Raspberry Pi is a series of small,
inexpensive, single-board computers (SBCs) developed in
the UK by the Raspberry Pi Foundation; Beaglebone is a
low-power, open-source SBC produced by Texas Instruments
in association with Digi-Key and Newark element14; and
Jetson Nano is a small, powerful computer for embedded
applications and AI IoT that delivers the power of modern AI
in a module. These SBCs have been used widely in education,
experimentation, and innovation projects. Süzen et al. [9]
provided a benchmark analysis study addressing this category
of systems.
B. THE ROLE OF ESs
When discussing embedded systems, it is necessary to know
the relationship and difference between embedded systems
and some terminologies, such as CPS and IoT. In 2006, the
term ‘‘CPS’’ was coined by Helen Gill from the National
Science Foundation (NSF). According to [10], ‘‘The term
of cyber-physical systems refers to the tight conjoining
of and coordination between computational and physical
resources’’. One of the essential characteristics that shape
the cyber-physical system concept is the ability to interact
with the physical world via actuators or sensors. Whereas
a cyber-physical system interacts with the external physical
world, the responsibility of computational operations lies on
the embedded system to steer the physical parts to perform
its predefined functions. An embedded system is a co-design
of hardware and software. The architecture of the hardware
system is shown in Figure 1. The software system of an
embedded system consists of the Operating System (OS)
and applications [1], [11]. One of the differences between
embedded systems and conventional computers is that they
are designed to perform specific functions and they are inte-
grated into a larger physical system. Sensors are used to sense
the external environment, and actuators are used to steer the
larger physical system. From this point of view, the embedded
system is, as a computing unit, added to a physical system to
shape the concept of the cyber-physical system [11], [2], [12],
as shown in Figure 2.
FIGURE 2. Relationship between embedded systems and cyber-physical
systems [11], [2], [12].
Therefore, CPS is the result of the combination of informa-
tion processing and the physical environment by using com-
puting processing. Similarly, in [5], [13], ‘‘Cyber-physical
systems are integrations of computation and physical pro-
cesses.’’ [12] The European Commission [14] also defined
the concept of cyber-physical systems as ‘‘the next generation
of embedded ICT systems that are interconnected and col-
laborated through the Internet of things and provide citizens
and business with a wide range of innovative applications
and services.’’ Another definition of CPS is given in [15]:
‘‘A system is comprised of a set of interacting physical and
digital components, which may be centralized or distributed,
and provide a combination of sensing, control, computation
and networking functions, to influence outcomes in the real
world through physical processes.’’
Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS) and
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are other types of CPS [15].
They are further associated with two concepts, Industry 4.0
and Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), between which
there exists an overlap. ‘‘Industry 4.0’’ was initially coined
by the German government as part of its ‘‘High-Tech
Strategy 2020’’ in 2010 and is all about connected value
chains—connecting and automatically integrating things and
processes to form cyber-physical systems [16]. Within the
modular structured smart factories of Industry 4.0, CPS
monitor physical processes, create a virtual copy of the
physical world and make decentralized decisions. With IoT
technologies, CPSs communicate and cooperate with each
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other and with humans in real time. Via the Internet of
Services (IoS), both intra- and inter-organizational services
are offered and utilized by participants of the value chain [15].
IIoT, first mentioned by General Electric, is a subset of IoT.
It leverages the power of smart machines and real-time ana-
lytics to take advantage of the data in industries such as man-
ufacturing, transportation, energy and health care, thereby
enhancing the productivity and reliability of communication
and control in mission-critical applications for transforma-
tional business outcomes [15], [17].
In addition, there are two other terms: Distributed Control
System (DCS) and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA). A DCS is a computerized control system for a
process or plant, usually with many control loops, in which
autonomous controllers are distributed throughout the system
but there is no central operator supervisory control. SCADA
is a system comprised of software and hardware to control
and monitor a process or application. It allows an operator in
a local center to monitor widely distributed processes (e.g.,
an oil or gas field, pipeline system, or hydroelectric gener-
ators), make set-point changes on distant process controllers
(e.g., opening or closing valves or switching), observe alarms,
and gather measurement information [4], [15], [18]. Figure 3
depicts the abstract relations between all the concepts men-
tioned above.
FIGURE 3. The relations between all relevant concepts.
From Figure 3, it can be seen that embedded systems (ES)
are the core component in all of these concepts. There-
fore, securing ESs is very important in all application
domains.
C. CHARACTERISTICS AND LIMITATIONS OF ES
Embedded systems have been applied in broad fields. In addi-
tion to their use in the daily life of individuals, such as
cell phones, tablets, and wearable products, ESs have been
used in various application domains. For example, in smart
home applications they are used to implement surveillance
cameras, remote control, cooling systems and temperature
control or thermostat systems. The applications of ESs can
be extended for governments, organizations, companies,
institutions, national infrastructures, in transportation, or to
implement the future trend towards smart cities. In terms
of their application conditions, embedded systems usually
have such characteristics as low power consumption, small
size, specific functionality, remote accessibility, unmanned
operation, real-time performance, and low cost. These char-
acteristics of ESs demonstrate their superiority over con-
ventional computers in pervasive and ubiquitous computing.
However, the connectivity of ESs to the Internet exposes them
to the same cyber threats as conventional computers. ESs
are characterized as remotely unmanned operation devices,
and the nature of ESs, and the fact that they operate without
human intervention, increases the chances of an attacker
exploiting vulnerabilities to penetrate these systems. Some-
times, embedded systems are required to operate in harsh
environmental conditions or under autonomous control where
they are far from human supervision, increasing the potential
for unauthorized physical access to these systems. This is a
fundamental security problem for most IoT devices. Hence,
if the attacker gains a fully unauthorized physical access
to the system, the confidentiality, integrity, and availability
of the system could be breached. As a result, a new chal-
lenge has emerged: how to ensure that the security goals
of the system are maintained under these circumstances.
The resource limitations of ESs poses tight constraints on
both communication and computing capacity [19]. Moreover,
the resource constraint problem [13] has given rise to many
challenges in creating advanced security solutions for ESs
and makes it difficult to meet their cybersecurity require-
ments. As stated byMeshram and Sasankar [20], ‘‘the limited
processing power implies that an embedded system typically
cannot run applications for defending against attacks as in
conventional computer systems (e.g., virus scanner),’’ and the
limited energy also prevents the implementation of advanced
security measures. The limited computing resources of ES
cannot support complex security schemes [21]. Several
studies have addressed characteristics of ESs such as low
power consumption and limited computing power in terms
of CPU and memory data processing, not only with regard
to the system performance requirements but also the prob-
lems and weaknesses of securing ESs [22], [23]. The study
in [24] addressed the relationship between the characteristics
and the problems of an embedded system in implement-
ing IoT devices. Hence, the capabilities of ESs face the
challenge of meeting the requirements of advanced secu-
rity solutions. Table 1 summarizes some of the limitations
of ESs due to their characteristics, and Table 2 presents
some of the security problems resulting from these
limitations.
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TABLE 1. Limitations due to the characteristics of ESs.
TABLE 2. Security problems due to the limitations of the ES.
III. SECURITY RISKS OF EMBEDDED SYSTEM
A. SECURITY PROBLEMS
Embedded systems are vulnerable to a wide range of attacks
that might breach their security. For instance, an exhaustion
attack could drain the power resource by increasing com-
putational tasks or the use of peripherals or sensors. Also,
ES is vulnerable to physical attacks: if attackers have physical
access to the system, they might conduct a physical intrusion,
tamper with the integrity of the system, and/or perform snoop
attacks on the system bus, as well as possibly causing sensor
or peripheral damage.
No matter what kind of system is under consideration,
embedded or conventional, they all have generic security
objectives: confidentiality, integrity, and availability. For
example, malware (e.g., buffer overflow attacks [24]) can
attack networked embedded systems. The stored data or cryp-
tographic keys of an embedded system or electronic currency
on smart cards are vulnerable to unauthorized access, and
they must be protected to ensure the security of ESs. Also,
the authenticity of an embedded system is vulnerable to
numerous attacks, such as forged, malicious, or incorrect data
or information produced by the system’s sensors, an unautho-
rized user, or unauthorized reprogramming.
The processor’s capabilities, which are the heart of the
embedded system, are at the top of the list, and they are
often unable to implement advanced security techniques such
as data encryption. Furthermore, the CPUs themselves have
insufficient hardware protection against logical and physical
attacks. Amore robust CPU couldmitigate a lot of attacks, but
these aremore expensive and normally limited to use on smart
cards or as dedicated secure elements in SoCs. Assuming
that the performance of the processor has been improved in
accordance with the requirements of advanced encryption,
this creates a new problem: the need for a significant amount
of energy, which may not be available in the case of portable
systems. However, if these two problems are resolved, wewill
face a new problem, which is that of cost. A small increase
in the cost of production, even if only a few cents, would be
very expensive and would affect competitiveness if millions
of units were manufactured [35].
Cybersecurity specialists often try to know the attacker’s
capabilities to prevent attacks. Indeed, the attacker’s abili-
ties depend on what is made available and unprotected in
terms of entry points in the attack surface. Hardware com-
ponents, such as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, USB or other input/output
interfaces, and software systems, such as operating systems
or applications, increase the capabilities and flexibility of
ESs, but may provide a greater attack surface for hackers;
thus, the system becomes more vulnerable for cyberattacks.
In other words, if the capabilities of ESs increase in terms
of points of connection and input units, then attack surfaces
increase, thereby increasing the probability that the system
is hacked. Compounding this problem is the easy avail-
ability of advanced, low-cost physical attack tools such as
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ChipWhisperer and ChipShouter that can be used to generate
side-channel attacks (SCAs) or glitch attacks [36].
On the other hand, although imposing restrictions on entry
points to the embedded system may contribute to reducing
the attacker’s chances, this conflicts with the importance of
system flexibility. The cybersecurity problems of embed-
ded systems are endless, and they differ according to the
assessment perspective and technical domain of application.
For example, several security problems are related to Inter-
net connectivity; several studies have addressed this prob-
lem [2], [37], [38]. Furthermore, the problem of data privacy
and policies was present in a study on smart cities [30], and
the problem of resource constraint and the need to design
lightweight encryption [39] and energy-efficient countermea-
sure strategies were discussed in [13], [19], [20]. The lack of a
unified theoretical framework in the design of CPS is an prob-
lem that deserves attention [40]. Also among the problems
is the operation of ESs in an unattended environment, which
creates several security challenges and is easily accessible to
the attacker, as well as the problem of the use of off-the-shelf
solutions [19]. The initial design stages and their importance,
as well as the neglect of the security requirements in the initial
stages of design, are discussed in [38], which reinforces the
urgent need to adopt a ‘security by design’ concept, not only
for this reason but also because the embedded systems are
designed for fixed purposes; thus, a successful attack on one
sample of the embedded system’s applications could facilitate
the repetition of the attack on other embedded systems of the
same type without additional cost or effort.
B. CLASSIC ATTACKS AND IMPACT ON ESs
Abomhara and Køien [24] addressed security risks in terms
of four aspects: vulnerabilities, exposure, threat, and attacks.
Vulnerabilities refer to weaknesses in a system, design defi-
ciencies, or weaknesses in policies or procedures that might
allow the attackers to have unauthorized access to data,
execute illegitimate commands or conduct attacks. Further-
more, vulnerabilities might be found in different software
layers: applications, operating systems, or communication
protocol stacks [24], [41], [42]. In the context of cyberse-
curity, a vulnerability is a weakness that can be exploited
by a cyberattack to gain unauthorized access to or perform
unauthorized actions on a computer system. Vulnerabilities
can allow attackers to run code, access a system’s memory,
install malware, and steal, destroy, or modify sensitive data.
Exposure risks refer to problems or mistakes in a system
configuration that might be exploited by an intruder. Threats
refer to the activities that take advantage of security weak-
nesses in a system to conduct a harmful impact [24], [43].
A cyber threat is a potential malicious act that might exploit a
vulnerability to breach security and, therefore, cause possible
harm. This threat can be an intentional action, accidental
event, or an abnormal circumstance. Cyber threats include
unstructured threats, which use existing hacking tools, and
structured threats, e.g., Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs),
conducted by an expert attacker [24], [28], [44], [45]. APT
is a prolonged and targeted cyberattack in which an intruder
gains access to a network and tries to remain undetected.
An APT attack usually seeks to monitor network activity and
breach the confidentiality of data rather than to cause direct
damage to the network or organization. APT attacks are often
preceded by planning, require tremendous experience, and
are intended to spy for a longer term [46].
Cyber-attacks refer to the actions taken by an attacker
to cause damage or harm to the system or disrupt normal
operations by using different techniques or tools. There are
many types of attacks: (a) physical attacks, (b) reconnais-
sance attacks, (c) denial-of-service (DoS), (d) access attacks,
(e) attacks on privacy, (f) cyber-crimes, and (g) destruc-
tive [24], [47], [48], [49]–[52]. Several challenges were
presented by [2], such as safety, security, and confiden-
tiality, as well as reliability, reparability, and availabil-
ity; this highlights the importance of cybersecurity defense
countermeasures implementation in embedded systems. For
network-connected systems, considering the four layers of
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) in
early stages of designing the embedded systemwill contribute
to hardening the ES. The layers of TCP/IP are Application
layer, Transport layer, Network layer, and Link and Physical
layer [28]; these layers play an important role in terms of the
security of the embedded system, as the weakness of the mea-
sures taken in these layers will create many vulnerabilities
that the attacker can exploit, and in return, the implementing
of best practices in these layers will enhance the stability
of the system. The biggest challenge facing an embedded
system is when it is connected to the public Internet, as it
faces unpredictable cyber threats. Although embedded sys-
tems usually sit at the bottom layer—the physical layer of
IoT systems—it is crucial to take into account the four layers
of the TCP/IP model to consider cyber-threats from upper
layers and the direct threat at the physical layer in the design
stage of embedded systems. Ali et al. [4] extensively dis-
cuss the security threats and vulnerabilities according to the
relationship between cyber-physical systems and the TCP/IP
model. Fitz et al. [53] discuss the effect of network topog-
raphy on the stability of cyber-physical systems’ connectiv-
ity. Networks can be categorized into six types: Star, Bus,
Linear, Ring, Tree, and Mesh. Mesh design, which could
be partially or fully connected, is the highest cost among
these topologies to maintain the connectivity of CPS and
its sensors. The International Organization for Standardiza-
tion (ISO) defines a 7-layer reference network model. The
physical layer accounts for an important proportion of energy
consumption, in addition to the existence of a lack of unified
specific standards for designers and developers of CPS tomit-
igate cyber risks. Figure 4 summarizes classic cyberattacks
on the TCP/IP layers.
Several valuable documents in the field of research were
published by the National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology (NIST) and related to NIST standards [54]–[60].
The impact of cyber-attacks on the functions of a cyber-
physical system was presented in [61] by reviewing a case
study of a rail transport system. The case studywas performed
based on Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) simulation to avoid
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FIGURE 4. TCP/IP layers and attacks [4].
any severe damage or danger for humans in the real world.
HIL acts as an interface platform between the physical com-
ponents (sensors in this case) and an embedded system, acting
as the computational part. The effect of a cyber-attack on the
efficiency of the functions of CPS was studied. It was shown
that digital attacks can affect the effectiveness of the functions
of CPS, causing significant delays transiting a signal between
a sender and a receiver when the infrastructure is attacked.
Prevention of cyber-attacks is a critical challenge due to
the diversity of attacks and the constraints of ESs. One of
the most critical stages in dealing with a cyberattack is the
detection of the attack itself. Late detection of an attack could
allow severe consequences, such as system damage, to occur,
whereas early detection allows for a suitable response. How-
ever, detection may require significant resources and limit
the functionality of the system. An inappropriate response
itself could also contribute to an attack and even be used by
an attacker. For example, suppose a system disables network
connectivity to prevent an attack. In this case, it could be
used to direct the re-connection to a fake access point, not
to mention the loss of availability during the disconnection
time. Some unfinished or unnecessary responses could also
conflict with the operation of a device, for example, safety-
critical operation, real-time or necessity of immediate func-
tional reaction and synchronization. Hence, an appropriate
strategy for detection and response is needed to avoid possible
damage but maintain the required functionality of a system,
and this is often a compromise.
Each embedded system has its own requirements and,
therefore, requires its own security methods. The absence of
specific manufacturing standards has exacerbated the prob-
lem of creating a unified and comprehensive security solu-
tion, [40] although the essence and architecture of embedded
systems are, in general, similar. As each system is designed
for its own purpose, specific security mechanisms are
required to support the functional requirements of the system.
C. CHALLENGES OF IMPLEMENTING CSES
IoT-enabled cyber-physical systems greatly increase the
diversity of ES applications. Conversely, the cybersecurity
vulnerabilities of ESs open the doors to countless types of
cyber-attacks, and this is one of the biggest challenges fac-
ing ESs enabled by IoT technology [2], [37], [38]. Another
challenge for the cybersecurity of ESs lies in the fact that
ESs could work in a non-controlled environment [19], in a
stand-alone and independent manner. Industry 4.0 raises the
new concept of security by design. Cybersecurity should
be considered when designing an embedded system, with
specific regard to the security challenges caused by the char-
acteristics of that system.
One of the most challenging aspects of embedded system
security design is having to implement the security objectives
within the system’s capabilities and to do this without focus-
ing on a specific aspect and neglecting to take into account
other aspects, or providing non-comprehensive solutions.
Habibzadeh et al. [30] found that the problem of existing
cybersecurity research lies in the focus on a single component
in a system, and they suggested that a robust CPS should have
the cybersecurity capabilities of all of its components and
that the security of a system is typically determined by its
weakest link. Hence, Habibzadeh et al. considered ensuring
the overall security of the system is the weakest link that
needs to be addressed to have a robust CPS. The ‘‘weakest
link’’ concept has been discussed at length in [62], and we
can define it in this context as ‘‘A guardian is an entity in
the system that the attacker could try to pass to gain access
to an asset. The cost of passing a guardian determines the
negative utility for the attacker when deciding to pass. The
cost is typically dependent on the entities an attacker already
has access to, such as keys or passwords’’ [62].
It is important to clearly understand the terminology of
security risks, security threats, cyberattacks, vulnerabilities,
and exposure risks [24], [7]. The distinction between these
terms contributes to clarifying the vision of the nature of the
risks facing ESs and their applications and, thus, facilitates
the diagnosis of the problem and the finding of an appropriate
security solution. A detailed explanation of these terms is
provided in Section B.
The challenges facing ESs begin at the initial design stages
and continue up to the final operational phase. During these
stages, some of the most obvious challenges hinder the design
of highly efficient countermeasures against cyberattacks,
such as processing gap, battery gap, flexibility, tamper resis-
tance, assurance gap, and cost [11], [19]. The design process
of an ES is influenced predominantly by cost; in terms of the
time factor, ES industries always pursue a fast development
cycle for market competition. This adversely affects manu-
facturers in applying high standards for the development of
advanced security solutions. Another critical challenge facing
ESs is the consumption and measurement of energy that
supports the functions of IoT components [63]. The opti-
mization of energy is demanded due to the constraints on
embedded system resources. The battery gap or the power
consumption optimization constitutes one of the most chal-
lenging design factors [11], [19]. Table 3 summarizes the
research directions on the security risks domain of ES.
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TABLE 3. Summary table of the research directions on security risks aspects of the embedded systems.
IV. CYBERSECURITY OF EMBEDDED SYSTEM
In this section, we will address three different aspects:
A. security objectives, B. security countermeasures, and
C. risk management and security incident response.
A. SECURITY OBJECTIVES
Cybersecurity, as defined in [66], [24], is a process to protect
an object against physical damage, unauthorized access, theft,
or loss, by maintaining high confidentiality and integrity
of information about the object and making information
about that object available whenever needed. To implement
effective countermeasures, we need to state the security
objectives clearly. The generic security objectives for all sys-
tems and services are Confidentiality, Integrity, andAvailabil-
ity, called the CIA triangle. Confidentiality means ensuring
the information is not made available or disclosed to unau-
thorized entities; integrity aims to protect the accuracy and
completeness, and the availability implies the information
is accessible and usable by an authorized entity when it
is demanded. In addition to the security triangle, accord-
ing to [67], [68] and based on ISO/IEC 27001:2013, [69],
embedded systems should also be designed with concerns
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of Authenticity, Accountability, Non-repudiation, Reliability,
Access Control, Dependability, Safety, and Privacy. These
security objectives are the cornerstone of the cybersecurity
industry in ESs. From the aspect of attackers, the barriers
implemented to meet the security objectives of embedded
systems are the target elements of attacks; on the other hand,
these security objectives are the goals to be achieved, main-
tained, and guaranteed by cybersecurity practitioners.
Many studies [19], [67], [68] have referred to the security
triangle, and these security goals are breached by a number
of different types of attacks. For example, confidentiality
could be breached by side-channel attacks, authentication
attacks, password attacks, packet sniffing, and session hijack-
ing. Integrity could be breached by packet dropping or packet
delay attacks and spoofing attacks. The availability could be
breached by a buffer overflow or Denial of Service (DoS)
attack, which target low memory capabilities and limited
computation resources. Most CPS devices are vulnerable to
such resource enervation attacks [24].
Industry 4.0 raises the concept of ‘‘Security by Design.’’
Cybersecurity is a critical challenge for the success of indus-
try 4.0. Taking security problems and challenges into account
in the design stage of a cyber-physical system is the most
efficient and effective solution. Also, it is considered the
least expensive approach in the long term, compared to the
post-processing of cyberattacks, and reduces the need for
more modifications or improvements in the final product.
Implementing the convergence between the capabilities of
embedded systems and cybersecurity objectives is a dilemma:
it conflicts with the current approach, where we always
strive to design embedded systems with low cost, small
size, and low energy consumption, compatible with mobil-
ity and dependability concepts, embeddable in larger CPS,
and with efficient and sufficient processing capacity. On the
other hand, the requirements of cybersecurity are inconsistent
with what we seek, as advanced security measures such as
sophisticated encryption or intrusion detection systems (IDS)
require high computing capabilities which require increas-
ing the transistor count, which in turn increases the cost,
size, and power consumption. Even adopting smaller sili-
con geometries (e.g., 7nm chips) that could help in terms
of size and power has a more expensive up-front cost and,
therefore, require higher sales volumes to be profitable and
cost-effective [70].
B. SECURITY COUNTERMEASURES OF ESs
Security countermeasures for embedded systems have been
extensively studied, and most security solutions can be
developed in the form of tools, methods, mechanisms,
or approaches. Habibzadeh et al. [30] suggested that security
countermeasures must be done in four dimensions of phys-
ical security: firmware-level, device-level, circuit-level, and
energy-harvesting- and storage-level. Dibaji et al. [71] cate-
gorized defense mechanisms against cyberattacks into three
types: prevention, resilience, and detection and isolation.
The prevention mechanism is designed to counter disclosure
attacks, such as Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs), and
the two main methods are cryptography and randomization.
Resilience refers to the ability of the system to continue to
perform its function despite the effects caused by the cyber-
attack. Several approaches to implement this mechanism
can be applied, for instance, game theory, event-triggered
control, mean subsequence reduced algorithms and trust-
based approaches. The detection and isolation mechanism
consists of five types: observer-based techniques, analyti-
cal consistency, watermarking, baiting, and learning-based
anomaly detection. Ashibani and Mahmoud [72] highlighted
that security measures should take place at three levels to
achieve maximum protection: perception, transmission, and
application layers.
Attack detection is one of the most important counterac-
tions because it is critical for active countermeasures as it is
directly associated with security countermeasures. We must
discover the existence of an attack before dealing with it.
There are different levels of defense: the first level of defense
is to prevent the attack entirely by design, using techniques
such as encryption and authentication [73]; the second level
is to detect the attack early and deal with it immediately to
stop any damage occuring by applying a detectionmechanism
such as an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) [73]; the third
level is to prevent the recurrence of the attack again by
taking the required countermeasures after knowing the type
of attack and impact of the attack. These levels of defense
against cyberattacks require more efficient techniques in dif-
ferent research areas [74], such as vulnerability identifica-
tion, impact analysis, mitigation, cybersecurity metrics, data
and model development, penetration testing, interoperability,
and digital forensics. Trawczynski et al. [75] provided an
approach to detect a DoS-type attack based on the failure of
a single node communication interface. Intrusion Detection
and Prevention Systems (IDPS) with multi-mode counterac-
tions is also one of the suggested security solutions [76]. The
counteraction technique is to block the attacker’s IP address
via a firewall, based on the number of packets exceeding
the threshold limit in one second. In the case of failure,
a remote stop of the corresponding service takes place as a
third counteraction. In this context, it is important to note that
the requirements of the IDS to inspect every packet requires
a high resource consumption that is not generally compatible
with the capabilities of ESs.
A comprehensive survey of physics-based attack detection
techniques was provided by [77], where the researchers high-
lighted that physical components of cyber-physical systems
(e.g., actuators or sensors) need to be monitored to detect the
attack based on any abnormality in the performance of these
physical components. Also, a discrete-time energy-based
attack detection mechanism for a networked cyber-physical
systemwas proposed by [78], where the detectingmechanism
is based on the energy balance of the system. Among the
existing solutions, Poongothai and Duraiswamy [73] applied
a machine learning technique in an IDS to mobile ad hoc
networks (MANET), which are not conventionally designed
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with an IDS, as an example of embedded system applications.
Whereas encryption and authentication techniques work as
the first line of defense, the IDS can work as a second line
of defense. Also, problems such as lack of central points, co-
operation, shared radio channel, limited resource availability,
and the lack of a clear line of defense and secure communi-
cation in MANETs have been addressed in [73].
Gu et al. [79] suggested improving security by using
a co-processor with the implementation of Mixed Integer
Linear Programming (MILP) formulation. Although this
approach may contribute to enhancing security aspects,
it might conflict with the characteristics of ESs’ resources or
cost. Wang et al. [27] presented a hardware-enhanced protec-
tion method to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of
data by using an AES stream encryption engine. Also, a com-
binational logic binding technique against cloning attacks
for FPGA-based embedded systems is discussed in [80].
Negi et al. [81] discussed the embedded systems in the appli-
cation field of networks, and the study conducted a test in
the transfer of data based on Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)
and Transport Layer Security (TLS). The adoption of this
protocol as a security protocol has shown promising results
in terms of sending and receiving data securely on the level
of embedded systems.
A survey of EU research efforts in the security solutions
of ESs has been done in [82], where security solutions for
ESs were classified to several levels: (i) Node-based security
technologies, for example a physical unclonable function
(PUF), a physically-defined ‘‘digital fingerprint’’ that serves
as a unique identity [30]; and (ii) network-based security
technologies, focusing on secure routing and Intrusion Detec-
tion System (IDS) for a distributed ES network, implemented
with middleware and overlay technologies. Among the stud-
ies that dealt with security solutions is also a preemptive
security mechanism, which is a thin-layer hypervisor-based
memory introspection engine on ESs and was proposed by
Lukacs et al. [83]. The concept of this mechanism is based
on hardware virtualization technology, and this mechanism
works on two different levels: privilege level and isolation;
and hardware-level virtualization. This technique has been
implemented on an x86 CPU, which paved the way for testing
this mechanism on ARM Cortex A53 and A57 chips.
Evaluating security requirements to adopt appropriate
security countermeasures based on different axes was pre-
sented by Elmiligi et al. [84]. According to Elmiligi et al.,
the security requirements can be evaluated from 27 different
angles and based on three main axes. These axes are the pro-
grammability level axis, integration level axis, and life-cycle
phase axis. Figure 5 depicts these axes and their different
angles [84].
It is also worth mentioning the criticality of a real-time
embedded system (RTES). Specific security countermea-
sures for RTES can be implemented in two stages:
(i) identify specific attacks that could threaten the systems;
and (ii) implement security-guaranteed services, overcom-
ing the challenges of real-time performance and energy
consumption [26]. The study in [85] showed how security
FIGURE 5. The 27 different angles [84].
measures could be circumvented in different platforms. This
demonstrates the importance of highly robust solutions and
their availability for a long period.
A non-intrusive runtimemonitoring technique for ensuring
the safety and security of ESs was presented in [86]. It is
based on the principle that finding and implementing solu-
tions on one aspect may depend on another aspect, because
the monitoring of non-intrusive runtime through power con-
sumption has been used to enforce safety and security in ESs.
This shows that some security solutions are indirect. In other
words, enhancing specific security aspects of the system will
reflect positively on other aspects.
A multi-metrics approach to ensure and evaluate Security,
Privacy, and Dependability (SPD) in ESs is provided in [87],
using a smart vehicle as a case study. Also, Mu et al. [88] pre-
sented a bottom-up approach for the information flow secu-
rity of a verifiable embedded system based on Gate-Level
Information Flow Tracking (GLIFT), at the early stages of
designing ESs. The concept of this approach is based on
applying restrictions to the information flow to allow only
legitimate data to pass through. Liu [89] proposed a security
kernel prototype system to support several security verifi-
cation strategies—for example, multiple levels of security
(MLS), Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), and Distribu-
tion Transforming Encoder (DTE) [89]. This security kernel
prototype system focuses on the security kernel in an embed-
ded system, and it is a very generic security prototype system.
‘‘Security by design’’ is critically required by Industry
4.0. At the design stage of ESs, it is required to integrate
security mechanisms into embedded systems according to
Model-Based Development (MBD) [90]. Thayer [91] stated
that the adversarial testing in the early stage of designing and
developing the embedded system would increase the overall
awareness of the threats posed to a system. Also, the high
energy efficiency of systems supports the implementation of
advanced cryptographic techniques [38]. While a stable and
sufficient energy source is essential, thus, it is important to
optimize the system for minimizing the energy consump-
tion, so that there is enough energy for preventing attacks.
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Hasler and Shah [92] addressed the security implications for
the ultra-low energy consumption of SoC FPGA embedded
systems.
A comprehensive framework for modeling and assessment
for penetration testing of IoT systems, taking attack surface
into account, is presented by [93], using a virtual proto-
type to validate the design of an IoT system. The adopted
model uses virtual prototypes (VPs) as a concept, which is a
method or technique implemented to validate a development
design before any real implementation. The VP is used to
develop a framework that aims to support security measures
in the initial stages of designing embedded systems. Also,
the authors in [94] presented a comprehensive experimen-
tal analysis of automotive attack surfaces. The experiment
showed severe vulnerabilities that an attacker could exploit,
and the results were shared with relevant industry and govern-
ment stakeholders. Reducing the attack surface by lowering
the attacker’s access based on a permission-based security
model is presented by [95] for Android applications. The sug-
gested approach is designed for detecting permission gaps,
using permission-based software.
In general, the adoption of a security solution depends
on several factors: the purpose for which it was designed;
the capabilities of ES to handle the solution; the nature of
the risks that may be exposed; and technical implementation
domains. It is also important to train operators with security
awareness and relevant knowledge.
C. RISK MANAGEMENT AND SECURITY INCIDENT
RESPONSE
Risk management and incident response are important for
the cybersecurity of embedded systems, especially net-
worked devices, because security threats cannot be elimi-
nated entirely [73]. A NIST report in 2014 [54] presented
a Cybersecurity Risk Management Framework (CRMF) for
modern vehicles, where embedded systems are important
components. Figure 6 depicts the security lifecycle presented
by NIST [54].
Wilbanks [96] proposed a Cyber RiskManagement Frame-
work (CRMF) and Cyber Security Risk Indicator (CSRI).
CRMF applied three principles: (i) integrating security coun-
termeasures into the systems development lifecycle, (ii) mon-
itoring and maintaining the status of the system, and (iii)
interacting with the current situation by making a risk mitiga-
tion decision. CSRI measures the efficiency and effectiveness
of the system by using quantitative criteria to assess the
robustness of the system, [96], [54].
In terms of incident response, the term ‘incident response’
may be related to other terms, such as ‘incident han-
dling’ and ‘incident management’. NIST does not give
strict definitions of ‘‘incident handling’’ and ‘‘incident
response’’. CERT R©/CC uses ‘‘incident handling’’ to refer
to the overall process of incident detection, reporting, anal-
ysis, and response, while ‘‘incident response’’ refers to inci-
dent containment, recovery, and notification of others [97].
As stated in the Cyber Security Incident Response Guide
from the Council for Registered Ethical Security Testers
FIGURE 6. NIST security life cycle [54].
(CREST) [98], ‘‘There is no common understanding of what
a cybersecurity incident is, with a wide variety of interpre-
tations. With no agreed definition, many organizations adopt
different views.’’ NIST breaks incident response down into
four broad phases: (1) Preparation; (2) Detection and Analy-
sis; (3) Containment, Eradication and Recovery; and (4) Post-
Event Activity. Phase 2 and Phase 3 are interactive with each
other. Dorofee et al. [99] classified incident management
into five major steps: prepare, protect, detect, respond, and
sustain. Incident response is not exclusive to administrative
level. Some technical solutions can support early incident
response, S. Sultana et al. [100] provided a security incident
response and prevention system (Kinesis) forWireless Sensor
Networks (WSNs). This system can dynamically respond to
anomalous events, based on a suspect’s security status, and
does not require any central authority to trigger an action.
According to CREST [98], [101], cybersecurity incidents,
particularly serious cybersecurity attacks (e.g., advanced per-
sistent threats (APTs)) have been causing serious damage to
organizations, governments, and international bodies. Com-
puter Emergency Response Team (CERT) [99], [102], and
NIST [54], [55] have made significant contributions in the
subject of cybersecurity incident responses.
As long as the ESs are as essential as traditional com-
puter systems and given the widespread applications of ESs
in many domains and at different levels in governments,
organizations, and individuals, the supervising parties must
have plans to respond to possible incidents following rec-
ommended standards such as CRMF or CSRI. If all security
measures at all levels fail to prevent and tackle a cyber-
attack, the responsible parties must at least be able to have
a fast response to the incident caused by the attack, thereby
reducing the damages and economic loss. They must learn
from the incident to ensure that the attack does not recur in
the future again. Figure 7 summarizes the research directions
in cybersecurity requirements for the ESs.
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FIGURE 7. Research directions in cybersecurity requirements of ESs.
V. ANALYTICAL RESULTS OF CSES
In this section, we will present the security risk metric; we
will also identify the influencing factors of CSES to shape the
MuLFESC framework, which can be used as an instrument of
security assessment for the ESs.
A. SECURITY RISK METRICS
Based on the analysis of the previous studies in this area,
multi-security risk metrics have been created and will be
presented in this section as part of the contribution. Cyberse-
curity risk for a system is the probability of exposure or loss
resulting from a cyberattack or data breach on the system.
The sensitivity of data, its value, and the benefits attackers
would gain from hijacking an asset are all large motivations;
however, attackers’ abilities are contingent on what has been
made inadvertently available to them.More entry pointsmean
more possibilities that a system can be exploited. In other
words, if the entry points in the attack surfaces are reduced
and the unnecessary services are disabled, the chances that
a system is attacked are reduced. Many studies have con-
sidered security risks from different perspectives, and based
on different criteria. According to NIST [56], [115], [116],
security metrics are metrics based on IT security performance
goals and objectives designed to assist decision-making and
improve performance and accountability by collection and
analysis of data against potential risk to take an appropriate
countermeasure.Within the security risks metrics model, Fig-
ure 8, the cyberattacks have been addressed from seven dif-
ferent perspectives, providing the broadest coverage of attack
probabilities. Thus, having a comprehensive perception of
attack possibilities will lead to having a comprehensive
awareness that will be reflected positively in the upcoming
Multiple Layers Feedback Framework of Embedded System
Cybersecurity, Figure 10. Optimal countermeasures can then
be taken in each layer, according to the perspective of eval-
uation. For example, tackling attacks from the asset value
angle will lead to the enactment of the necessary policies in
layer 7 to protect the assets according to the sensitivity of
the data. Also, addressing attacks based on the attack surface
will help in disabling unnecessary entry points in layer 3.
Besides, evaluating attacks from the targeted network layer
perspective will help in adopting the most secure appropriate
protocol, and so on. Therefore, the reflected feedback on
layer one fed from other layers (Figure 10) as a continuous
process will be enriched by considering these perspectives to
achieve best practices and implement a compatible counter-
measure, avoiding any conflict with requirements of the other
layers.
We define security risks within a metrics of different crite-
ria, based on the security triangle: Confidentiality, Integrity,
and Availability (CIA) [19], [67], [68], as the backbone
of the security risk metrics (CIA terms are explained in
section IV.A). They are what attackers intend to breach
ultimately, regardless of the methods or attack surface.
Figure 8 depicts the adopted security risk metrics, while
(X) refers to a security risk. Based on this risk metrics, a
security risk can be addressed from 7 perspectives:
(1) A security risk X should be examined against the pro-
posed Multiple Layers Feedback Framework of Embedded
System Cybersecurity (MuLFESC), at the same time consid-
ering the twelve influencing factors, as illustrated in Figure 9.
Figure 11 in Appendix also presents these factors with more
details.
(2) Security risk can be assessed based on attack meth-
ods. According to [64], methods of attacks can be classified
into three different typical methods: (1) physical method,
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(2) logical or software-based method, and (3) Side-Channel
attack method.
-- A physical attack, whether non-invasive, semi-invasive,
or invasive attack means an attacker’s ability to access
the cyber-physical system directly and this direct phys-
ical access is unauthorized and unauthenticated [64].
In this case, it is unpredictable to know what the attacker
can do. Also, natural disasters fall within this type of
security threat [24], [64]. A fault attack is an example
of a physical attack that can be generated to attack an
electronic device, and it can be executed by stressing a
targeted device beyond its expected operational limits,
causing errors [117]. These errors might lead to security
failures on the system such as bypassing authentication
checks or leaking sensitive information.
-- The logical or software-based methods are often used to
attack networked ESs through the Internet. The attacks
are carried out by exploiting vulnerabilities or exposing
errors in software [24], [64], whether in the operating
system (OS), applications, protocols used for data trans-
fer, or decryption of the encrypted data.
-- In Side-Channel Attacks (SCA), an attacker studies the
often unexpected, indirect physical effects of security
operations. In this type of attack, the attacker monitors
and analyzes system activities produced by its physical
components such as electromagnetic emission, power
consumption, timing, and cryptanalysis to gain access
to protected data 67]. NIST defines a sid-channel attack
as follows ‘‘An attack enabled by leakage of information
from a physical cryptosystem. Characteristics that could
be exploited in a side-channel attack include timing,
power consumption, and electromagnetic and acoustic
emissions’’ [55]. There are 12 possible attacks based on
this method: (1) acoustic attack, (2) brute force attack,
(3) cache-based attack, (4) electromagnetic analysis,
(5) error message attack, (6) frequency-based attack,
(7) glitch attack, (8) power analysis, (9) timing analysis,
(10) safe error attack, (11) scan-based attack, and (12)
visible light attack [64].
(3) Security risks can be classified into four different types
based on their nature: Vulnerabilities, Exposure, Threat, and
Attacks [24] (see section III.B).
(4) Attack surface is the sum of all possible security risk
exposures. There are three types of attack surfaces [65]:
-- The hardware surface can be any possible components
in a cyber-physical system or an embedded system, such
as sensors for receiving or sending signals, USB ports or
Input/output units.
-- The software surface, including the logicality of algo-
rithms and protocols, can be in any levels of OS,
firmware, protocol handlers or applications.
-- Finally, the network-components surface.
As mentioned earlier, a smaller attack surface can help make
the system less exploitable, reducing the risk; and a greater
attack surface makes the system more vulnerable to attacks,
which increases the risk. Cheng et al. [118] verify this
security problem through using redundant controller archi-
tecture to avoid unpredictable mechanical failures, but unfor-
tunately this technique increases the chance of exploiting the
attack surface and lowers the sensitivity to respond to ongoing
attacks.
(5) The security risk due to network connectivity can
be assessed in terms of the four- layers TCP/IP model:
Application layer, transport layer, network layer, and link
and physical layer [4]. There could be different attacks in
each layer; examples of these attacks were discussed in
section III.B.
(6) The security challenges in terms of the limitations of
the embedded system have been discussed by [25], includ-
ing processing gap, battery gap, independence, flexibility,
installation in an uncontrolled or harsh environment, remote-
ness and unmanned operation, connectivity to the network,
the function’s nature of the CPS, and cost. The cybersecurity
risk often arises from the limited resources in embedded
systems.
(7) Taking into account the attacker’s capabilities and the
value of the assets is essential for the assessment. A skilled
attacker with significant resources poses a much higher risk
than a low skilled attacker with few resources. The value
of assets, including data, is important. The more sensitive
the data, the more security measures are required to ensure
its confidentiality, integrity, and availability. While evalu-
ating the efficiency and effectiveness of the applied mea-
sures, taking attackers’ capabilities and assets’ values into
account might help improve the adoption of appropriate secu-
rity. The following figure depicts the suggested security risk
metrics.
FIGURE 8. Security risk metrics.
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B. KEY FACTORS OF THE MuLFESC FRAMEWORK
After presenting the multi-security risk metrics, which can
predict the largest possible number of cyberattacks in terms
of methods, types, surfaces, TCP/IP layer, and limitations
of the ES’s resources, this section addresses the key factors
that affect the CSES. The determination of the influencing
factors could help identify the gaps and weaknesses in the
current countermeasures. Figure 9 represents these influenc-
ing factors that have been extracted from the existing research
trends, while Figure 10 represents the MuLFESC frame-
work layers with its involved parties and system components
affected by these factors. TheMuLFESC framework has been
shaped by taking into account the following factors:
1) THE ARCHITECTURE OF ES IN CPS
Weak computing capabilities of ES could limit the ability to
implement advanced security solutions regarding the compo-
nents and architecture of ES in CPS. Failure to consider secu-
rity requirements at the design stage of ESs could increase the
complication of implementing cybersecurity objectives and
requirements in a complicated CPS [13], [8], [119], [84], [88].
2) THE CHARACTERISTICS OF ES
Features of embedded systems and their flexibility in meet-
ing the requirements of modern technologies earned them
excellence over traditional computers. However, these char-
acteristics pose many challenges for the cybersecurity of
ESs [20], [56].
3) THE IMPLEMENTATIONS OF ES
‘‘Embedding systems’’ is a broad concept applied to form
the computational part of a wide diversity of applications.
Therefore, the diversity of ESs reflects positively on its appli-
cations [120], [81], [121], and the constraints of ESs’ char-
acteristics and the attack surfaces that can be exploited pose
many security challenges. This requires developing market-
appropriate security solutions whether in the field of health-
care, communications, military, etc.
4) THE TECHNICAL DOMAINS OF ES
Embedded systems are the core or the basic block of advanced
technologies, such as DCS, SCADA, IACS, ICS, Industry
4.0, Industrial, IIoT, IoT, and CPS. The realization of an
embedded system with security by design could therefore
support the security, stability, and reliability of advanced sys-
tems [122], [123]. However, security requirements and solu-
tions need to be considered in the context of different tech-
nical domains. The study and test of the embedded system
should be done under the context of its real-world applica-
tions; thus, the goals of the applications as well as the perfor-
mance in efficiency, reliability, and stability can be reached.
5) THE SECURITY OBJECTIVES OF ES
Embedded systems have the same objectives of cyber-
security as traditional computer systems, which include:
confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, account-
ability, non-repudiation, reliability, access control,
FIGURE 9. The relationship between the twelve factors.
dependability, safety, and privacy. The security requirements
depend on the context of application domains. In contrast,
the characteristics of ESs raise the challenges in the imple-
mentation of embedded system security to achieve these
objectives [19], [67], [68].
6) THE DIVERSITY OF SECURITY PROBLEMS IN ES
Security risks of embedded systems are raised due to various
factors, such as the existence of various attack surfaces in
a CPS, the connectivity of the Internet, and human factors.
Different application systems may have different security
problems. For example, if a CPS is characterized as an
autonomous system without human intervention, security
problems are more likely referred to the physical security
of ESs. If a CPS is characterized as an IoT-enabled system
with the function of exchanging data or information with the
Internet, a remote attack could threaten the CPS through the
Internet. If a CPS is characterized as a system with a move-
able power source and low energy utilization rate, the security
problems may affect the sustainability of the energy source
and the capacity of providing sufficient energy to meet the
requirements of advanced applications. Embedded systems
are lightweight and compact. The characteristics of ESs have
given the limitations in the implementation of cybersecurity
of ESs, which may require increasing the capability of the
CPU to perform more complex operations, thus enabling
ESs to apply complex encryption, other strong security algo-
rithms, and so on [2], [37], [38], [37].
7) CONNECTIVITY AND TCP/IP MODEL
The connection of ESs to the Internet enables them to pro-
vide services and features that were not available without
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the connection. However, embedded systems could become
vulnerable to a large number of cyber-attacks remotely [4].
For example, wireless connectivity can lead to the leakage of
sensitive data [124].
8) ATTACK SURFACE AND CHANNELS
The main factors that could cause cyber threats or prob-
lems are: the attack surfaces which provide attackers with
the entry points; network connection, which provides a way
to remotely approach the system; and actors/operators, who
provide opportunities to attackers for social engineering. The
security problems and the characteristics of the embedded
system make the implementation of a secure embedded sys-
tem challengeable. Attacks are always carried out through
one of the components of the targeted embedded system, such
as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, sensors or USB, as an attack surface.
An attack could have different attack channels [64], [65].
Attacks on embedded systems can be carried out in different
forms and on different attack surfaces and channels. Security
vulnerabilities exist at different levels, and security threats
come from the exploitation of existing vulnerabilities in a
system.
9) IMPACT OF CYBER ATTACKS
Once an embedded system is attacked, the impact of the
cyber-attack could affect the whole targeted system and
the systems connected to the targeted system. Therefore,
the requirements and solutions of cybersecurity should be
considered from the design, implementation to responses,
thus, to prevent and mitigate the damage and economic loss
due to cyber-attacks. Figures 9 and 11 illustrate the relation-
ship between the twelve factors with some examples.
Cyberattacks usually aim to damage or breach a security
objective, such as confidentiality, integrity, and availability
of assets or a combination of these security objectives. For
example, when an attacker intends to monitor the traffic of
data, violating the confidentiality of the data, the attacker
also needs to breach the authentication of the connection;
when an attacker gets unauthorized access to the storage of
data and tampers with the stored data, this is violating the
integrity and confidentiality of the data, and the impact of this
attack might be on system resources in the form of increasing
energy consumption or draining processor capabilities [86],
[125]. A cyber-attack could produce severe consequences,
e.g., the damage of all systems connected to the targeted
system. Hence, it is important to consider the impacts and
responses to potential cyber incidents, caused by attacks on
these levels [92], [26], [85], [126], [123].
10) THE SECURITY CHALLENGES OF ES
The compromise between maintaining the characteristics of
embedded systems and meeting cybersecurity requirements
are the challenges of secure ESs [12], [72], [127], [128].
Therefore, there is an urgent need to find comprehensive and
advanced security solutions while not draining the resources
of the embedded system or conflicting with its properties.
These solutions should be implemented, crossing all levels of
the ES, as shown in Figure 10. In the nine levels of protection,
the first level is to implement ‘‘security by design,’’ and the
design should consider all cyber threats from level 2 to level 9.
In section C, we will explain all these levels in more detail.
11) THE SECURITY SOLUTIONS OF ES
To ensure security solutions are effective and comprehensive,
they must be compatible with the nature of the system charac-
teristics and must be adaptive at all levels. In general, security
solutions can be developed in the form of tools, methods,
mechanisms or approaches. The best solution is to implement
‘‘Security by Design’’, regarding the security crossing all
levels.
12) ACTORS OR PLAYERS
Manufacturers, suppliers, developers, installers, operators,
and legislators play an important role to secure embedded sys-
tems. User behavior and the awareness of social-engineering-
based attacks are also important [127], [129]–[133], [134].
As shown in Figures 9 and 11, the 12 aspects are strictly
related to each other, and to design a protected CPS in an
interconnected domain; it is important to secure ESs, as they
are connected to each other and may be linked to the Internet.
C. MULTIPLE LAYERS FEEDBACK FRAMEWORK OF
EMBEDDED SYSTEM CYBERSECURITY (MULFESC)
Taking the determined twelve factors into account in con-
junction with the MuLFESC layers (Figure 10) will lead to
building a robust and secure embedded system to the highest
standards. The nine layers of exposed risks that need to be
protected are depicted in Figure 10.
The MuLFESC framework consists of nine layers. These
layers represent the involved entities and components in the
CSES abstractly, and based on the nine layers, we can identify
the vulnerabilities and cyber threats in each layer, which can
be the inputs for improving the design of the system. The
first layer is the initial design stage, and this layer is critical:
it must be improved iteratively based on the feedback from
the other eight layers to implement the ‘‘Security by Design’’
concept. The second layer (CPS) is the most abstract concept
of the applications of ESs in different aspects of life. The
third, fourth and fifth layers are the core of the MuLFESC
framework and are the components targeted by the attacker.
Therefore, better-adapted standards in the other layers will be
reflected positively on these three layers. The communication
layer with its protocols are the window to the outside world
of CPS, and the gateway for remote exploitation. Layers
7 and 8 represent the required role of legislators, operators,
users, manufacturers, developers, installers, suppliers, and
service providers to set the appropriate policies that guarantee
privacy, proper use, and right of access to the parties con-
cerned in a manner that guarantees them the highest safety
standards. Finally, the impact of the adopted security coun-
termeasures taken in all layers will be monitored in the oper-
ational stage, which is considered as a real test layer of the
strength and durability of securitymeasures, and the feedback
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FIGURE 10. The MuLFESC framework.
must be positively reflected onto the first layer fromwhichwe
set out to improve the security countermeasures.
From the protection perspective, security countermeasures
should be integrated at the design stage (Layer 1) and take
the properties at different layers of embedded systems into
account. The ability to adopt more efficient generic security
solutions means the ability to design more robust systems
despite the different technical domains. Layer 2 is to secure
the physical components of CPS that interact with the outside
world, such as sensors and actuators; Layer 3 is to secure the
attack surfaces, such as I / O modules, access points such as
Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and USB; Layer 4 is to secure the compu-
tation components that might be compromised as a result of
the attack such as CPU,memory, and power source; Layer 5 is
to secure the software layer, including the operating systems,
firmware and applications that should be able to deal with var-
ious attacks and handle advanced security solutions; Layer 6
is to secure the Internet connection layer (TCP/IP model)
by securing routes and adopting security protocols to ensure
a secure transfer of data between a sender and a receiver.
Therefore, it is necessary to provide the most secure commu-
nication protocols to reduce the capabilities of the attacker
and to design ESs with capabilities compatible with the most
secure protocols. Layer 7 is to ensure the designed embedded
systems are compliant to the legislation and regulations, such
as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) or the
California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), thus ensuring the
privacy and protection of users’ data. Layer 8 is to regard
the role of actors and players, including users, operators,
manufacturers and legislators, etc.; therefore, their roles must
be defined clearly to prevent cyber-attacks. Layer 9, the oper-
ational phase, should set up necessary risk management and
assessment. The feedback from Layer 2 to Layer 9 can be
used to improve the security design of ESs, and based on the
feedback from the operational phase, the developers of CSES
can refine the design of the system, thus eliminating cyber
risks.
MuLFESC provides a guidance for ‘‘Security by Design,’’
which is required by industry 4.0. The design stage is essen-
tial for the implementation of CSES. The engineering cycle
of CSES, such as implementation, test, and verification, are
strictly required for the final security of a system, and the
security of algorithms and protocols is especially critical.
Optimal security solutions are the comprehensive solutions
that cover all aspects at various levels. This is what was
reached and extracted based on the analysis of previous
studies and the extracted influencing factors. Based on that,
the security framework shown in Figure 10 has been sug-
gested as a comprehensive reference for comprehensive secu-
rity assessment and solutions.
From the security risk perspective, these nine layers are
exposed to many risks. The following table summarizes some
security risks against each layer of theMuLFESC framework.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we conducted an analytical study in the field
of cybersecurity for embedded systems in order to iden-
tify the deficiencies or gaps that need further research to
improve the cybersecurity of ESs. The lack of compatible
security solutions in line with the capabilities of embedded
systems has provided the opportunities for attackers to find
exploitable vulnerabilities and carry out various attacks. This
is because the security of embedded systems is limited by
their resource constraints, rather than the absence of advanced
security solutions. Unfortunately, most of the advanced secu-
rity solutions require a lot of computational resources and
high-power consumption, so there is an urgent need to find
effective and efficient solutions that do not drain the resources
of the system.
Based on the architecture of ESs and the studies carried out
in this field, we have identified the most critical factors that
play an essential role in the cybersecurity industry for embed-
ded systems. These factors draw the overall landscape of the
cybersecurity industry for CSES, and they affect each other
directly or indirectly. Also, we have reviewed the research
on security risks and assessment methodologies regarding all
aspects of cybersecurity of ESs and proposed a new assess-
ment perspective within a metrics of risk assessment linked
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FIGURE 11. Overall landscape of Cyber Security of Embedded Systems (CSES).
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TABLE 4. Security risks against MuLFESC layers.
to MuLFESC. The determined influencing factors have been
employed to shape the Multiple Layers Feedback Framework
of Embedded System Cybersecurity (MuLFESC) in line with
the security risk metrics model.
The proposed MuLFESC Framework could contribute to
the implementation of comprehensive and effective ‘‘Security
by Design’’ solutions by providing feedback to the design
stage of CSES.
Overall, taking the identified key factors, the proposed
MuLFESC, the risk assessment metrics, and all involved
parties of CSES into account will facilitate the mission
for security practitioners to carry out a comprehensive
assessment. Thus, more efficient application-specific secu-
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